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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
JUBILEE LAW LECTURES: 1889-1939, by Roscoe Pound and others.
The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.
C., 1939. Pp.' 182.
This book contains the eight lectures delivered at the School
of Law of the Catholic University of America in connection with
its participation in the festivities celebrating the Golden Jubilee
of that institution. The first four lectures, which are by Dean
Roscoe Pound,. cover the general topic, "The Church in Legal His-
tory." The remaining four lectures, on the "Function of Law in
Society Today," were prepared by Daniel J. Lyne, Grenville
Clark, the Honorable Hector David Castro, and John J. Burns.
Dean Pound's series of lectures reveals him at his best, in
that field in which he excels-legal history. At times he is so
much the historian that it is difficult to determine whether he
speaks as a narrator of history or whether he is giving his own
views, which may not coincide with accepted historical tradition.
He certainly discusses the field in the law wherein the Church
played her most important role. He considers the role of the
Church in relation to four fundamental ideas, namely, univer-
sality, authority, good faith, and law. No better examples of the
influence of the Church could be chosen.
To Dean Pound "The idea of universality- is the antidote to
extravagant nationalism,"', and in his lecture on universality he
points out that current philosophies of law based upon economic
determinism, psychological realism, skeptical realism, and phe-
nomenalism can lead only to state absolutism.2 The stress which
he places on the importance of law rather than laws is quite
sound-and peculiarly appropriate at this time when law schools
are teaching only laws instead of law; which to Dean Pound, "is
something that gives vitality to rules of law and makes it pos-
sible to use them as instruments of justice."3 It is sincerely hoped
that -Dean Pound will remain in contact with law schools for
many years to come, notwithstanding his retirement as Dean of
the Harvard Law School, for the very reason that he appreciates
the difference between teaching laws and law, and realizes the
great importance of instruction in the latter.
In his first lecture Dean Pound urges a return to the idea of
universality, which once was developed by the Church. He sees
evidence of a trend for a unification in the law in this country in
1. P. 8.
2. P. 6.
S. P. 4.
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the work of the National Conference of Commissioners of Uni-
form State Laws, in that of the American Law Institute with its
restatements of the law, in the influence of national law schools,
and in the revival of studies in comparative law. 4
.In his second lecture on the idea of authority Dean Pound
gives two bases for the quest for authority: The first is psycho-
logical and rests on man's distrust for his fellow man who is given
power over him; the second is economic, resting "on the need of
predictability of judicial and. administrative action as assuring
long term enterprises and inyestment of time and energy and
money therein."5 Concerning the psychological basis he makes
the following accurate and very interesting observation:
"Few things are more striking in legal history than the obstin-
ate fondness of men in all times for mechanical, non-rational
disposition of causes, not on their merits, but on technical pro-
cedure and rigid rule..,They have preferred unjust results un-
der arbitrary rules to just results under what they feared
were arbitrary men."
6e
The accuracy of this statement is discernible-in the fight which
has been made in this country against the development of ad-
ministrative law.
In his development of the roles of the Church and the Scho-
lastic philosopher in the evolution, of the concept of authority
Dean Pound apparently falls into an error common to many law-
yers who have not read deep into the writings of St. Thomas
Aquinas, especially into his Summa Theologica. Dean Pound says,
"Reason was appealed to, to sustain authority. But the reason ap-
pealed to was a reason itself resting on authority. '7 This is quite
true on the theological level, but on the philosophical level it is
expressly refuted by St. Thomas Aquinas, who wrote that "argu-
ment from authority based on human reason is the weakest, yet
the argument from authority based on divine revelation is the
strongest."8
The role of the Church in developing the idea of authority
is succinctly summed up by Dean Pound at the conclusion of his
lecture in the following statement:
"The Middle Ages left as a permanent contribution to legal
science the method of insuring certainty by logical develop-
4. Pp. 21-22.
5. P. 33.
6. Ibid.
7. P. 41.
8. Summa Theologica, P. 1, Q. 1, a. 8.
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ment of the content of authoritatively established precepts,
and we owe this method, the oldest and most generally used,
and most effective instrument in the lawyer's tool box, to the
* jurist theologians and theologian philosophers of the church
working side by side with those who as doctors of the civil as
well as the canon law shaped the formative modern Roman
law."9
In discussing the idea of Good Faith the author first shows
that there was no room for such a concept in a period of strict
law which deified formality, and that the only force behind the
idea of good faith during such period was the Church,10 which
originally introduced it in the chancery courts (as in the case of
the infiltration of the doctrine of fiduciary obligations into the
rigid rules governing contracts)." He concludes this lecture with
a well-founded pessimistic note when he says:
"Today unhappily there is no such force (as the Church) be-
hind it. The legal order is operating under a heavy burden in
a time of extreme secularization in which the tasks of social
control formerly performed by the teaching and internal dis-
cipline of the home and conspicuously by the teaching and
internal discipline of religious organization are cast upon the
law., 12
Dean Pound's fourth lecture, on the idea of Law, is the most
interesting, the most informative and the most challenging of his
series. He begins by saying, "In the beginnings of the legal order
there are laws. We can hardly say there is law."'" From this one
might infer that Pound believes that the legal order starts with
legislation. Such an inference would be a mistaken one. Innate
in every man is a direction from his Maker, which must be fol-
lowed under penalty of the deprivation of the end of man. Like
the maker's direction to the purchaser of an automobile it is a
direction to act according to his nature. If an automobile is used,
contrary to its nature, as a pile-driver it will not fulfill its pur-
pose, and therefore will not attain the end for which it was de-
signed. So also with man, if he ignores the dictate of Natural Law
to do good and avoid evil he will suffer the punishment for such
violation of Natural Law as apprehended by his reason, and he
will not merit the end of man-happiness.
9. P. 46.
10. P. 71.
11. P. 63.
12. P. 71.
13. P. 72.
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This fourth lecture contains an excellent summary of the
ideas of law as they have evolved through the centuries. It con-
cludes with a declaration that the world presently needs phi-
losophers of the organizing genius of Aquinas and Aristotle "to
make what has come after them fruitful for mankind.' '1 4
The second series of lectures reprinted in this book are en-
titled "The Function of Law in Society Today." The first of this
series, "The Future of the Common Law," was delivered by
Daniel J. Lyne. In it is traced the development of the common
law in instances such as the change from the concept of liability
only upon the fault of the wrongdoer, to the present theory of
liability without fault as evidenced in workmen's compensation
legislation and other laws of a similar nature.15
This lecture which is well prepared, and adequately docu-
mented concludes with a thought which is frequently lost sight
of. The lecturer cautions against change for change's sake, and
says that "the law is also charged with the duty of seeing to it
that the urge for constant change does not obliterate the proven
values of the past."' 6
Grenville Clark supplies the next lecture, "Law and Civil
Liberty." The discussion is limited to freedom of expression in
the field of public affairs, and Clark restricts the term, law, to
mean that which is on the books. With these limitations it is a
well developed thesis which thoroughly covers the field. The au-
thor establishes his contentions forcefully with direct and ade-
quate reasons.
The following lecture, "Natural Law and Positive Law," by
his Excellency Hector David Castro, Minister Extraordinary of
El Salvador, affords an excellent summary review of these two
types of law from a comparative standpoint. Natural law and
positive law are often regarded as inconsistent. However, Dr.
Castro clearly demonstrates that they are correlatives-that the
natural law gives man certain inalienable rights and that it is the
function of positive law to recognize such rights, regulate their
use without impairing them, "and to determine the kind and the
extent of the cooperation that is required from the individual in
order to take care of the needs of the State."' 7
Dr. Castro's lecture is excellent. Without hesitation it is
14. P. 97.
15. Pp. 106-107.
16. P. 125.
17. P. 151.
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recommended to be read by all who have ever experienced any
difficulty with the two concepts of natural law and positive law.
The closing lecture on Law and Ethics, was delivered by
John Burns. Although the recapitulation of what had been said
in the previous seven lectures is not necessary to those who read
these lectures in published form, the summary was appreciated
as an integrating agent for the entire series of lectures.
Beginning by defining and differentiating between law and
ethics Mr. Burns continues to show how the influence of the phi-
losopher upon the law is more subtle and less immediate but
nonetheless more permanent than the influence exerted by any
other agency.18 Among other examples given in support of this
proposition is the one showing the recognition of human personal
rights over property rights, arising out of the early spring gun
cases.'19
Like Dean Pound, Mr. Lyne and Mr. Clark, Mr. Burns also
touches upon some of the problems of administrative law, and
perhaps with a more appreciative and informed attitude than
that of the others.
He concludes with a comparison between the pessimism of
Spengler and the optimism of the modem Aristotle, Jaques
Maritain.
Whatever might be the criticism of the content of any one of
these lectures there certainly cannot be anything but praise for
the School and its Dean Robert J. White who sponsored them.
They are a definite contribution to the jurisprudential literature
of our day. JAMES J. KEARNEY*
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Third edition), by George
Grafton Wilson. West Publishing Co., St. Paul, 1939. Pp.
xxiv, 623. $5.00.
This is the third edition of Professor Wilson's well-known
textbook on international law. In style and general content it is
similar to the former editions. In the preface the author acknowl-
edges that "International law has in recent years given more
weight than formerly to social and economic factors in the life of
nations," then adds, "but the principles of law have remained."
18. P. 167.
19. P. 169.
* Member of the Faculty, College of Law, University of Notre Dame.
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